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The Soviet press has published the following communique
issued by the Soviet Information Bureau, entitled uFalsilicators
of History (An Historical N ote)n:

the end of January, the State Department of the United
.
States of America, in collaboration with the British and
French Foreign Offices, published a collection of reports and
various records from the diaries of Hitlerite diplomatic officials,
under the mysterious title: "Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941."
As evident from the preface to this collection, as far back as
the summer of 1946 the Governments of the United States of
America, Great Britain and France had already agreed to publish
archive materials of the German Foreign Office for 1918-1945,
seized in Germany by American and British military authorities.
Noteworthy in this connection is the fact that the published collection contains only material relating to the period of 1939-1941,
while material relating to the preceding years, and in particular
to the Munich _period, has not been included by the Department
of State in the collection and thus has been concealed from world
public opinion. This action is certainly not accidental, but pursues
aims which have nothing to do with an objective and honest treatment of historical truth.
In order to justify in some way before world public opinion
the unilateral publication of this collection of unverified and
arbitrarily chosen records made by Hitlerite officials, the British
and American press fabricated and circulated an explanation
according to which "the Russians rejected the proposal of the West
to publish jointly a full account of Nazi diplomacy." This statement of Anglo-American circles does not correspond to the fact.
The real facts are as follows:
In connection with reports which appeared in the foreign
press during the summer of 1945 to the effect that preparations
for the publication of documents captured in Germany had been
initiated in England, the Soviet Government approached the
Governlnent of Great Britain, insisting on participation of
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Soviet experts in a joint study of the German documents captured
by Anglo-American troops. The Soviet Government held that
publication of such documents without common consent was
inadmissible and that at the same time it could not assume responsibility for the publication of the documents without careful and
objective verification, for unless these elementary conditions were
observed, publication of the said material could only lead to the
worsening of relations between the member - states of the antiHitlerite coalition.
The British Foreign Office, however, declined the Soviet proposa~ on the grounds that the Soviet Government had prematurely
raised the question of exchanging copies of the captured Hitlerite
documents.
It is also well known that on September 6, 1945, the
American delegation to the Political Directorate of the Control
Council in Germany submitted its draft directive on the handling
of German archives and documents. This draft provided for the
institution of a uniform procedure for the whole of Germany for
collecting and keeping archives, and gave the right of access to
them to representatives of member states of the United Nations.
I t also 'provided for the possibility of copying the documents and
publishing these copies. This proposal was examined at four
meetings of the Political Directorate, but its further examination
was postponed at the request of the British and Americans on the
plea that they had no instructions; subsequently, after the American representative had stated that the Government of the United
States of America was preparing a new proposal, and had requested
that the submitted draft be invalidated, this question was withdrawn from the agenda of the Political Directorate.
Thus, the allegation that the Soviet Government refused to
take part in preparing the publication of German archive materials
is false.
Simultaneously with the publication of the above-mentioned
collection, a fresh campaign of unrestrained baiting and slander,
as if at the wave of a . magic wand, swept the United States and
countries dependent on it, in connection with the non-aggression
pact concluded between the USSR and Germany in 1939, and
alleg:edly directed against the Western Powers.

Thus the true purpose for which the collection of documents
on relations between the USSR and Germany in the period of
1939-1941 was published in the United States of America evokes
no doubt whatever. This was not done for the purpose of giving
an objective exposition of historical developments, but in order to
present a distorted picture of events, to heap lies on the Soviet
Union, to slander it, and to undermine the international influence
of the Soviet Union as a truly democratic and staunch fighter
against aggressive and anti-democratic forces.
This treacherous attitude is in conformity with the views on the
character of inter-allied relations which are typical of the ruling
circles of the Anglo-American countries, and the substance of
which is that, instead of honest and sincere relations between
allies, instead of mutual confidence and support, there is being
pursued a policy of using every means, including even slander,
for the purpose of weakening one's ally, of exploiting him in one's
own narrow interests, and of strengthening one's own position at
the expense of that ally.
One should not, moreover, lose sight of the efforts being made
by the ruling circles of the United States of America to under. mine, by means of their campaign of slander against the USSR,
the influence of progressive elements in their own country, who
advocate better relations with the USSR.
The attack on progressive elements in the United States of
America is undoubtedly aimed at undermining their influence in
view of the Presidential elections to be held in the autumn of 1948.
The collection is full of documents concocted by Hitlerite diplomatic officials in the depths of the German diplomatic offices. This
fact alone should have served as a warning against unilateral use
and publication of documents which are one-sided and tendentious,
giving an account of events from the standpoint of the Hitler
Government, and which are intended to present these events in a
light which would be favorable to the Hitlerites. Precisely for
this reason, the Soviet Government was opposed to unilateral publication of the captured German documents without preliminary thorough and joint verification of them.
Even the French Government . news agency, France Presse,
found itself compelled to admit that the procedure of publication
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of the materials to be published by the three Governments without the knowledge of the Soviet Union, "is not quite in accord
with normal diplomatic procedure". Nonetheless, the British Government did not agree with this.
The American, British, and French Governments have unilaterally published the German documents without hesitating to
falsify history in their efforts to slander the Soviet Union, which
bore the brunt of the struggle against Hitlerite aggression.
By doing so, these Governments have assumed full responsibility
for the consequences of this unilateral action.
In view of this, the Soviet Government on its part feels itself
entitled to make public the secret documents concerning relations
between Hitler Germany and the Governments of Great Britain,
the United States of America and France which fell into the
hands of the Soviet Government, and which the above-mentioned
three Governments concealed from public opinion.
They concealed these documents; they do not want to make
them public. But we believe that after all which has taken place
these documents must be made public, so that historical truths can
be re-established.
The Soviet Government possesses important documents which
were captured by Soviet troops during the smashup of Hitler
Germany; publication of these documents will help to present
a true picture of how Hitler's aggression and the Second World
War were in reality prepared and develope.d.
The same purpose is also served by the historical note, "Falsificators of History", now being published by the Soviet Information Bureau under the Council of Ministers of the USSR.
Secret documents pertaining to this subject will be publishedshortly.
1. How Preparations for German Aggression Were Commenced.

A

fakers and their British and French associates are
trying to create the impression that the preparations for German aggression which developed into the Second W orId War were
begun in the autumn of 1939. Yet who can swallow this bait
nowadays but absolutely naive people prepared to believe any
sensational fabrication?
MERICAN
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Who does not know that Germany began preparing for war
imm·ediately . after Hitler had come to power? Who does not
know, moreover, that the Hitler regime was established by German monopoly <;ircles with the full approval of the ruling camp
of England, France and the United States?
In order to prepare for war and to provide herself with the
most mod~rn armament, Germany had to restore and develop her
heavy industry, and first of .all her metallurgical and war industries in the Ruhr. Having sustained defeat in the first imperialist war Germany, then under the yoke of the Versailles treaty,
.could not do this with her own forces in a short period. German
imperialism was rendered powerful support in this matter by the
United States of America.
Who does not know that in the post-Versailles period, American
banks and trusts, acting in full accord with the Government, made
investments in German economy -and granted Germany credits
running into billions ~f dollars, which were spent on reconstruction and development of the war industrial potential of Germany?
I t is known that the post-Versailles period was marked for Germany by a whole system of measures directed toward the reconstruction of German heavy industry and in particular of the
German war industrial potential.
Of tremendous importance in this respect was the so-called
Dawes Reparation Plan for Germany by means of which the
United States of America and England planned to render German industry dependent upon American and British monopolies.
The Dawes Plan cleared the road for a heavy influx and infiltration of foreign, chiefly American, capital into German industry.
As a result of this, the rise of German economy caused by an
intensive process o·f re-equipm'e nt of production machinery had
already begun in 1925. At the same time, German exports rose
sharply and by 1927 reached the level of 1913, while in the case
of manufactured goods they even surpassed that level by 12 per
cent (in 1913 prices). During the six years from 1924 through
1929, the influx of foreign capital into Germany totalled between
10 and 15 billion-odd reichsmarks for long term investments and
more than six billion reichsmarks for short term investments.
According to some sources, the volume of capital investments was
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consid'e rably higher. This led to a colossal growth of the economic,
and in particular, of the war, potential of Germany. A leading
part in this matter was played by American capital investments
which amounted to no less than 70 per cent of the total long term
loans.
Well known is the role played by American monopolies
headed by the DuPont, Morgan, Rockefeller, and Lamont families and other industrial barons of the United States in financing
German heavy industry and in establishing and expanding exceedingly close connections between American and German industries.
The leading American monopolies proved to be most closely ,
connected with German heavy industry, war industry concerns
and banks.
The leading American chemical concern, E. I. duPont de
Nemours & Co., Inc. and the British Imperial chemical trust
(Imperial Chemical Industries) which was one of the largest
shareholders of the General l\1otors automobile trust, maintained
close industrial relations with the German chemical concern, I. G.
Farbenindustrie, with which in 1926 they concluded a cartel
agreement for a division of the' world powder market. Before the
war, the president of the Board of Directors of Rohm and Haas
Company in Philadelphia was a partner of the head of the same
company in Darmstadt (Germany). Incidentally, at present, the
former director of this concern, Rudolf Mueller, is active in
"Bizonia" and plays an important part among the leaders of the
Christian Democratic Union. Schmitz, the German capitalist
president of I. G. Farbenindustrie and a member of the board of
Deutsche Bank, controlled the General Dyestuffs Corporation, an
American firm, during the period from 1931 to 1939. After the
Munich Conference (1938), the American Standard Oil trust
signed a contract with I. G. Farbenindustrie under which the
latter was given a share in the profits from the ' production of
aviation gasoline in the United States and in return willingly
ceased exporting from Germany synthetic gasoline which it was
prod ucing and which Germany was storing up for war needs.
Such connections are not typical of American capitalist monopolies
alone. Thus, extremely close economic relations not only of commercial but also of military importance existed, on the very eve
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of war, between the Federation of British Industries and the
German Reichs Industrie group. In 1939, representatives of these
two monopolies issued a joint statement in Dusseldorf which said
in part that the purpose of the agreement was "to secure the fullest
possible cooperation between the industrial systems of their respective countries." And this took place at a time when Hitler Germany had swallowed Czechoslovakia! No wonder that the London magazine Economist wrote in this connection: "Is there not
something in the Dusseldorf air that makes reasonable men lose
their senses ?"l
The well known Schroder Bank in which a leading part was
played by the German steel trust V ereinigte Stahlwerke, which
was organized by Stinnes, Thyssen and other captains of Ruhr
industry and ha'd its headquarters in N ew York and London,
furnishes a typical example of the close interweaving of American
and German as well as British capital. Allen Dulles, director of
Schrqder Banking Corporation in N ew York, ~hich represented the Schroder interests in London, Cologne and Hamburg,
played a leading role in the affairs of this bank. The well-known
Sullivan & Cromwell law firm headed by John Foster Dulles,
now Mr. Marshall's chief adviser and closely connected with
Rockefeller's world oil trust, Standard Oil, as well as with the
Chase National Bank, the most powerful' bank in America which
made enormous investments in German industry, played the leading
role in the N ew York headquarters of the Schroder Bank. In his
book which appeared in New York in 1947, Richard Sasuly stresses
the fact that no sooner had inflation been checked in Germany in
the post-Versailles period and the reichsmark had gained strength
than a torrent of foreign loans ru'shed into Germany. Between
1924 and 1930 Germany's foreign debt increased by more than
thirty billion reichsmarks. With the help of fore'ign, chiefly
American, capital, German industry, especially the Vereinigte
Stahlwerke '(a German firm), was extensively reconstructed and
modernized. Some loans were granted -d irectly to companies which
played a leading ' part in rearmament. 2
1 Corwin D. Edwards, Economic and Political Aspects of International
Cartels, 1944.
2 Richard Sasuly, 1. G. Farben, Boni and Gaer, New York, 1947, p. 80.
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Dillon, Read & Co., one of the largest N ew York banks, of
which James Forrestal, the present Secretary of Defense, had been
a director for a number of years, played a leading part in financing
the German steel trust Vereinigte Stahlwerke in that period along
with the Anglo-German-American Schroder Bank. 3
I t was this golden rain of American dollars that fertilized the
heavy industry of Hitler Germany and in particular her war
industry. It was billions of American dollars invested by overseas
monopolies in the war economy of Hitler Germany that re-established Germany's war potential and placed in the hands of the
Hitler regime the weapons it needed for aggression. Relying on
the financial support which came chiefly from American monopolies, Germany within a short period of time re-established a powerful war industry that was capable of producing enormous
amounts of first-rate atmament, thousands upon thousands of
tanks, planes, and guns as well as naval ships of the latest designs
and armament of other kinds. Fakers of history would like to forget
all ' this, as they are trying to evade responsibility for their policy
which supplied Hitler aggression with arms, unleashed the Second
World War and led to war ' disaster without parallel in history,
which cost mankind millions upon millions of victims.
Thus it must not be forgotten that the first and foremost prerequisite of Hitler aggression was provided by the resurgence and
modernization of Germany's heavy industry and war industry, and
that this became possible only as a result of the direct and extensive financial support rendered by the ruling circles of the United
States of America. And yet this is not all.
Another factor of decisive importance which helped to unleash
Hi tler aggression was the policy of the ruling circles of England
and France which is known as the policy of "appeasing" Hitler
Germany, a policy of renouncing collective security. At present
it should be clear to everyone that it was this policy of British and
French ruling circles as expressed in their renunciation of collective security, in their refusal to resist German aggression, in their
3 Stock Exchange Year Book, London, 1925; Who's Who in America;
, Who's Who in American Finance; Moody's Manual of Corporations," Poor's
Manual of Corporations, 1924-1939.
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connivance with Hitler Germany's aggressIve demands, that led
to the Second World War.
We shall now turn to further facts. In 1933, soon after Hitler
came to power, a "Pact of Accord and Cooperation" was signed in
Rome by the four Powers-Great Britain, Germany, France and
Italy-through the efforts of the British and French Governments.
This pact signified that the British and French Governments
came to terms with German and Italian fascism, which even at
that time did not try to conceal its aggressive intentions. At the
same time, this pact with the fascist states signified the renunciation of the policy of strengthening the united front of the peaceloving powers against the aggressive states. By coming to terms
with Germany and Italy behind the backs of the other powers
who were taking part in the disarmament conference which was
being held at that time and was discussing a Soviet proposal on the
conclusion of a non-aggression pact and of a pact on the definition
of an aggressor, Great Britain and' France dealt a blow to the
cause of peace and the security of nations. Soon after, in 1934,
Eng~and and France helped Hitler to take advantage of the
inimical attitude of their ally Poland-ruled by her gentrytoward the USSR, and this resulted in the cond usion of the
non-aggression pact between Germany and Poland which formed
one of the important stages in the preparation of German aggressIon.
Hitler needed this pact for the purpose of disorganizing the
ranks of the adherents of collective security and to show by this
example that what Europe needed was not collective security
but bilateral agreements. This enabled the German aggressor to
decide for himself with whom to conclude agreements and when
to conclude them, whom to attack and when to do so. Beyond any
doubt, the German-Polish pact constituted the first serious break
in the edifice of collective security. Hitler grew bold and openly
took a series of steps to re-establish Germany's armed forces without encountering any opposition on the part of the rulers of England and France. On the contrary, soon after that, in 1935, a naval
agreement between Britain and Germany was concluded in London
where Ribbentrop had arrived for this purpose. Under this agreement, Great Britain consented to re-establishment of German
11
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naval forces in a strength which nearly equalled that of the French
Navy. Besides, Hitler obtained the right to build submarines with
an aggregate displacement amounting to 45 per cent of that of
the British submarine fleet. During the same period, Hitler Germany also took unilateral actions aimed at abolishing all other
restrictions on the growth of Germany's armed forces that" had
been imposed by the Treaty of Versailles. These actions encountered
no opposition on the part of England, France or the United
States. The appetite of the fascist aggressors grew every day with
the manifest connivance of the United States, Great Britain and
France.
It was certainly not accidental that at that time both Germany
and Italy easily got away with their arm-ed interventions In
Ethiopia and Spain.
The Soviet Union alone consistently and firmly pursued its
policy of peace, championing the principles of the equality and
independence of Ethiopia, who was moreover a member of the
League of Nations, and the right of the lawful Republican Government in Spain to receive the support of the democratic countries against German and Italian intervention.
"The Soviet Union," said V. M. Molotov at the session of the
Central Executive Committee of the USSR on January 10, 1936
in connection with Italy's attack on Ethiopia, "has demonstrated
in the League of Nations its fidelity to this principle-the principle
of the political independence and national equality of all states,
in the case of one of the small countries, Abyssinia. The Soviet
Union has also taken advantage of its membership in the League
of Nations to put into practice its policy toward an imperialist
aggressor."4 Molotov said also at that time that "The ItaloAbyssinian war shows that the threat of a world war is growing
and is steadily spreading over Europe."5
And what were the Governments of the United States, Great
Britain and France' doing at that time, under whose eyes the
fascist bandits were dealing ever more insolently with their victims? They did not as ,much as lift a finger to curb the German

v.

M. Molotov, Articles and Speeches, 1935-,1936, p. 176.
5 V. M. Molotov, Articles and Speeches, 1935-1936, p. 177 .
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and Italian aggressors, to defend the rights of nations which were
being trampled upon, to preserve peace and to stop the Second
World War which was approaching. The Soviet Union alone was
doing everything possible in order to block the fascist aggressors'
way. The Soviet Union came forward as the initiator and champion of collective security. As early as February 6, 1933, M. M.
Litvinov, the Representative of the Soviet Union in the General
Commission on Disarmament, proposed that the Commission adopt
a declaration on the definition of aggression and aggressor.
In proposing a definition of aggressor, the Soviet Union held
that it was necessary in the interests of general security and in
order to facilitate agreement on the maximum reduction of armaments to define the term "aggression" with the utmost possible
precision in order to "forestall every pretext for its justification."
This proposal was, however, declined by the Conference; which
was acting under the direction of England and France for the •
benefit of German aggression. Everybody knows what a persistent
and prolonged struggle was waged by the Soviet Union and by
its delegation to the League of Nations, headed by Litvinov, to
maintain and consolidate collective security. Throughout the
whole prewar period, the Soviet delegation upheld the principle of
collective security in the League of Nations, raising its voice in
defense of this principle at practically every session of the League
of Nations, in practically every commission of the League of
Nations. It is known, however, that the voice of the Soviet delegation remained a voice in the wilderness.
The whole world is familiar with the proposals made by the
Soviet delegation concerning measures for strengthening collective security, proposals which, on the instruction of the Soviet
Government, were addressed to Mr. Avenol, Secretary-General
of the League of Nations, on August 30, 1936, with a request
that they should be discussed by the League of Nations.
It is also known, however, that these proposals were buried in
th~ archives of the League of Nations and that no action was
taken on them. It was clear that England and France, who controlled the League of Nations at the time, rejected collective
resistance to German aggression. They rejected collective security
because it stood in the ,·w ay of their newly adopted policy of
13

"appeasing" German aggression, a policy of concessions to Hitler
aggression. Naturally, this policy could not but result in the
intensification of German aggression, but the ruling Anglo-French
circles believed that this was not dangerous because, having satisfied Hitler aggression by concessions in the West, they could then
direct this aggression to the East and utilize it as a weapon against
the USSR.
In his report to the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union in March, 1939, J. V. Stalin, analyzing
the reasons for the growth of Hitlerite aggression, said:
"The chief reason is that the majority of the non-aggressive
countries, particularly England and France, have rejected the
policy of collective security, the policy of collective resistance
to the aggressors, and have taken up a position of non-intervention, a position of neutrality."6
In order to confuse the reader and at the same time to slander
the Soviet Government, Neal Stanford, an American journalist,
asserts that th~ Soviet Government was opposed to collective
security, that Litvinov was dismissed and replaced by Molotov in
the post of the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs because he
had been pursuing a policy of consolidating collective security.
One could hardly imagine anything more stupid than this fantastic
assertion. It is clear that Litvinov did not pursue any policy of
his own, but the policy of the Soviet Government. On the other
hand, everybody knows what a struggle for collective security was
waged by the Soviet Government and by its representatives,
including Litvinov, throughout the prewar period.
As regards the appointment of Molotov to the post of People's
Commissar of Foreign Affairs, it is perfectly clear that in the complex situation, when fascist aggressors were preparing the Second
World War, when Great Britain and France, backed by the
United States of America were plainly abetting the aggressors
and spurring them on to start a war against the USSR, it was
necessary to have in such a responsible post as that of People's
Commissar of Foreign Affairs a political leader with greater
experience and greater popularity in the country than Litvinov.

• J. V. Stalin, Report on the Work of the Central Committee to the
Eighteenth Congress of the CPSU (B).
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The rejection of the collective security pact by the Western
Powers was not fortuitous.
I t was in that period that the struggle between two lines in
world affairs had developed. One' was that of the struggle for
peace, for the organization of collective security and for resistance
to aggression by the joint efforts of the peace-loving nations.
This was the line the Soviet Union was pursuing, consistently
and staunchly defending the interests of all peace-loving nations,
great and small. The other line was that of rejecting the organization of collective security, of refusing to oppose aggression, and
this inevitably encouraged' the fascist countries to intensify their
aggressive activity and thereby helped to unleash a new war.
Historical truth, as can be seen from all this, consists of the
facts that Hitlerite aggression became possible, firstly because the
United States of America helped the Germans to establish within
a short time a war economic base for German aggression and thus
provided this aggression with arms; and secondly, because the
rejection of collective security by the ruling Anglo-French circles
disorganized the ranks of the peace-loving ' countries, disrupted '
the united front of these countries against aggression, paved the
road for German aggression and helped Hitler to unleash the
_Second World War.
What would have happened if the United States had not
financed Hitler Germany's heavy industry, and England and
France had not rejected collective security, but on the contrary
had organized jointly with the Soviet :Union collective resistance
to German aggression? The result would have been that Hitlerite
aggression would lack armament, Hitler's annexationist policy
would have been caught in the vise of a system of collective
security, the Hitlerites' chance of success in unleashing the Second
World War would have been reduced to the minimum.
And if in spite of unfavorable conditions, the Hitlerites had
still ventured to unleash the Second World War, they would have
been defeated in the very first year of war. Unfortunately, this
did not happen because of the ruinous policy which was pursued
by the United States of America, England and Franc.e during
the course of the whole· prewar period.
It is they who' are guilty of allowing the Hitlerites to unleash
15

with some measure of success the Second World War, which
lasted nearly six years and took millions of human lives.
2. Not a Struggle Against German Aggression but a Policy of
Isolating the USSR.
UBSEQUENT develog ents have shown with still greater
clarity that by their concessions to and connivance with fascist countries, which in 1936 formed a military-political bloc
known as the "Berlin-Rome Axis", the ruling circles in Britain
and France had only encouraged and goaded Germany toward
aggresSIon.
Rejecting the policy of collective security, Britain and France
took up a position of so-called non-intervention, characterized by
]. V. Stalin thus:
" ... the policy of non-intervention might be defined as follows: 'Let each country defend itself from aggressors as it
likes and as best it can. That is not our affair. We shall trade
both with aggressors and with their victims.' But, actually
speaking, the policy of non-intervention means conniving at
aggression, giving free rein to war, and consequently transforming the war- into a world war."7
Stalin further pointed out that:
". . . the big and dangerous political game started by the
supporters of the policy of non-intervention may end in a serious fiasco for them."8
As far back as 1937, it became perfectly clear that a great war
was being hatched by Hitler with the direct connivance of Great
Britain and France. Documents of the German Foreign Ministry
captured by Soviet troops after Germany's defeat reveal the true
essence of Great Britain's and France's policy of the time. These
documents show that, essentially, Anglo-French policy was aimed
not at mustering the forces of the peace-loving states for a common struggle against aggression, but at isolating the USSR and
directing the Hitlerite aggression toward the East, against the
Soviet Union, at using Hitler as a tool for their own ends.

S
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Eighteenth Congress of the CPSU (B) , Stenographic Report, Ogiz,

1939, p. 13.
8 Ibid, p. 14.
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The rulers of Britain and France were well aware of the trend
of Hitlerite foreign policy, defined by Hitler as follows:
"We, the National Socialists, consciously put an end to our
prewar foreign policy. We begin where we ended six centuries
ago. We stop the Germans' eternal drive to Europe's South
and West, and turn our eyes to the lands in the East. We
break at last with the colonial and commercial policies of prewar times and go over to a territorial policy of the future.
But when we now, in Europe, speak of new lands, we should
have in mind first of all only Russia and the bordering countries under her rule. Destiny itself seems to show us the way."9
It was customary until lately to consider that ~ntire responsibility for the Munich policy of treachery rests with the ruling circles
of Britain and France, with the Governments of Chamberlain
and Daladier.
The fact that the American Government undertook tb make the
German files public, while excluding the documents pertaining to
the Munich agreement, shows that the United States Government
is interested in whitewashing the heroes of the Munich treachery
and in putting the blame on the USSR. The substance of Britain's
and France's Munich policy was sufficiently clear even before
this. Documents from the archives of the German Foreign Ministry, now at the disposal of the Soviet Government, furnish,
however, abundant new data which reveal the true meaning of
the prewar diplomacy of . the Western Powers; they show how
the destinies of nations were played with, how brazenly these
Powers traded in other peoples' territories, how they had been
secretly re-dividing the map of the world, how they encouraged
Hitlerite aggression, and they show the efforts made to direct
that aggression toward the East, against the Soviet Union.
This is eloquently borne out, for in~tance, by a German document recording a conversation which took place between Hitler
and the British Minister, Halifax, in the presence of Von N eurath, the German Foreign Minister, in Ob~rsalzburg on November 19, 1937. Halifax declared that
"he (Lord Halifax) and the other members of the British
9

A. Hitler, Mein Kampf, Munich, 1936, p. 742.

17

Government were fully aware that the Fuehrer had attained
a great deal, not only inside Germany herself, but that having
destroyed Communism in his country, he had barred the road
of the latter to Western Europe, and that therefore Germany
was entitled to b~ regarded as the bulwark of the West against
Bolshevism."lo
Speaking on behalf of the British Pr.ime Minister, Chamberlain, Halifax pointed out that there was every possibility of finding a solution even of difficult problems if Germany and Britain
could reach . agreement with France and Italy too.
Halifax said that
"there should not be an impression that the Berlin-Rome Axis,
or tlilat good relations between London and Paris, would suffer as a result of Anglo-German rapprochement. After the
ground is prepared by Anglo-German rapprochement, the four
great West-European Powers [i.e., Great Britain, France,
Germany and Italy] must jointly set up the fdundatio~ for
lasting peace in Europe. Under no conditions should any of the
four Powers remain outside this co-operation, or else there
would be · no end to the present unstable situation."ll
In other words, Halifax, as far back as 1937, had proposed to
Hitler on behalf of the British. Government, that Britain as well
as France should join the Berlin-Rome Axis.
To this proposal, however, Hitler replied with a statement to
the effect that such an agreement among the four Powers seemed
to him very easy to arrange if good will and a kindly attitude prevailed, but that it would prove more difficult if Germany were
not regarded "as a state which no longer carr.ied the moral and
material stigma of the Treaty of Versailles."
In reply to this, Halifax, according to the record, said:
"'Britishers are realists and perhaps more than others are
convinced that the errors of the Versailles dictate must be
rectified. Britain has always exercised her influence in this real10 The Record of a conversation between the Fuehrer and Reichskanzler
and Lord Halifax, in the presence of the Reichsminister of Foreign Affairs,
in Obel'salzberg, Nov. 19, 1937,· from the Archives of the German Ministry
of Foreign Affairs.
U Cit. The Record of a co"!'versation.
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IstlC sense in the past.' He pointed to Britain's role with regard to the evacuation of the Rhineland ahead of the time
fixed, the settlement of the reparations problem, and the reoccupation of the Rhineland."12
From the further record of Hitler's conversation with Halifax,
it is evident that the British Government viewed favorably Hitler's
plans for the "acquisition" of Danzig, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. Having discussed with Hitler the questions of disarmament and the League of Nations, and having noted that further
discussion was needed, Halifax ~tated:
"All other questions can be characterized as relating to
changes in the European order, changes which sooner or later
will probably take place. To these questions belong those of
Danzig, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. England is only interested that these changes should be effected by peaceful evolution, so as to avoid methods which may cause further convulsions, undesired either by the Fuehrer or by other countries."13
This conversation evidently was not the mere sounding out of
an interlocutor, which sometimes is called for by political necessity; it was a deal, a secret agreement of the British Government
with Hitler about satisfying the annexationist appetites of the
latter at the expense of third countries. In this connection, the
statement in Parliament of the British Minister Simon on February 21, 1938, is noteworthy. He said that Great Britain had
never given special guarantees regarding the independence of
Austria. This was a deliberate lie, because such guarantees were
given by the Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain.
At the same time, British Prime Minister Chamberlain stated
that Austria could not count upon any protection on the part of
the League of Nations:
"We must not try to delude ourselves, and still more, we
must not try to delude small weak nations into thinking that
they will be protected by the League against aggression and
acting accordingly, when we know that nothing of the kind
can be expected."14
Ibid.
18 Ibid.
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In this way the makers of British policy encouraged Hitler to
annexa tionist actions.
In the German archives captured by the Soviet troops in Berlin,
there is also a record of Hitler's conversation with Henderson,
British Ambassador to Germany, which took place in the presence
of Ribbentrop on March 3, 1938.15 From its very outset Henderson stressed the confidential nature of the conversation, intimating
that its content would be withheld from the French, Belgians,
Portuguese and Italians, who would merely be told that a conversation took place as a continuation of negotiations which had
been carried on between Halifax and Hitler and related to
questions of concern to Germany and Britain.
Speaking on behalf of the British Government, Henderson in
this conversation stressed that:
"This is not a commercial deal but · an attempt to establish
the basis for a genuine and cordial friendship with Germany,
beginning with the improvement of the situation and ending
with the creation of a new spirit of friendly understanding. "16
Without objecting to Hitler's demand to "unite Europe without Russia," Henderso'n drew attention to the fact that Halifax,
who at that time became Foreign Secretary, had already agreed
to those territorial changes which Germany intended to make in
Europe, and that
"the purpose of the British proposal was participation in such
a reasonable settlement."
Henderson, according to the record, also said that Chamberlain
"displayed great courage when heeding nothing, he unmasked
such international phrases as collective security, etc. . . ."
"Therefore," added Henderson, "Britain declares her readiness to remove all difficulties and asks Germany wheth~r she is
ready, for her part, to do the same."17
When Ribbentrop intervened, drawing the attention of Henderson to the fact that the British Minister to Vienna "in a
115 Record of a conversation between the Fuehrer and Reichskansler and
the British Royal Ambassador which took place in the presence 0/ Reichsminister /01' Foreign Affairs von Ribbentrop, on March 3, 1938 in Berlin,
from the Archives of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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dramatic way" had made a statement to von Papen on events in
Austria, Henderson hastened to dissociate himself from the statement of his colleague, declaring that "he himself, Neville Henderson, often expressed himself in favor of Anschluss." Such was
the language of prewar British diplomacy.
Immediately after that deal, on March 12, 1938, Hitler seized
Austria, having met with no resistance on the part · of Britain and
France. At that time, only the Soviet Union raised the voice of
warning, and once again came forward with an appeal to organize collective protection of the independence of countries which
were threatened by aggression.
.
It was on March 17, 1938, that the Soviet Government sent
a note to the Powers in which it expressed its readiness "to proceed
to discussion, with other Powers in or outside the League of Nations, of practical measures" which "would aim at stopping further aggression and eliminating the increased danger of a new
world butchery."is
The reply of the British Government to the Soviet note proved
the unwillingness of the British Government to hinder these plans
of Hitlerite aggression.
The reply stated that a conference for taking
"concerted action against aggression would not necessarily, in
the view of His Majesty's Government, have a favorable effect
upon the prospects of European peace. "19
The next link in the chain of German aggression and the preparation of war in Europe was the seizure of Czechoslovakia by
Germany. And this most important step in unleashing war in
Europe could be talHn by Hitler only with the direct support
of England and France.
On July 10, 1938, Dirksen, the German Ambassador to London, reported to Berlin that for the British Government
"one of the most essential planks of its program is to find a
compromise with Germany", and that "this Government displays with regard to Germany such a maximum of understand18

Izvestia, March 18, 1938.
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ing as could be displayed by any of the likely combinations of
British politicians."2o
Dirksen wrote that the British Government "has come nearer
to understanding the most essential points of the main demands
advanced by Germany; namely: to keep the Soviet Union out
of deciding the destinies of Europe; likewise to keep out the
League of Nations; as well as the advisability of bilateral
negotiations and treaties."
Dirksen also reported to Berlin that the British Government was
ready to make great sacrifices to "meet the other just demands
.
of Germany."
Thus, between the British Government and Hitler there was
indeed established a far-reaching accord on foreign policy plans,
which fact Dirksen so lucidly reported to Berlin. It is not necessary to recall the universally known facts relating directly to the
Munich deal. But one cannot forget that on September 19, 1938,
i. e., four days after Hitler's meeting at Berchtesgaden with Chamberlain, who arrived for this purpose by plane, representatives of
the British and French Governments demanded from the Czechoslovak Government the transfer to Germany of the Czechoslovak ·
regions populated mainly by Sudeten Germans.
They maintained that if this demand were not complied with,
it would be impossible to preserve peace and to secure the vital
in terests of Czechoslovakia.
The Anglo-French sponsors of Hitler's aggression attempted
to cover their treachery with the promise of an international guarantee of the new frontiers of the Czechoslovak State as "a contribution to the pacification of Europe."21
On September 20, the Czechoslovak Government replied to
the Anglo-French proposals. It declared that "acceptance of such
proposals would be tantamount to the voluntary and full disruption of the State in all its directions." The Czechoslovak Government drew the attention of the British and French Governments to the fact that "the paralysis of Czechoslovakia would
10 Political Report, London, July 10, 1938, in addition to Report A No.
2589 of July 10, a. c.; from the Archives of the German Foreign Office.
:n. Correspondence respecting Czechoslovakia, September 1938, London,
1938, C md 5847. p. -.
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result in deep political changes in all Central and Southeastern
Europe. "
"The balance of power in Central Europe and in Europe in
general," stated the Czechoslovak Government in its answer,
"would be destroyed; that would entail far-reaching consequences for all other states and especially for France."
The Czechoslovak Government addressed its "last appeal" to
the Governments of Britain and France to reconsider their point
of view, emphasizing that this was in the interests not only of
Czechoslovakia, but of her friends as well, in the interests of "the
entire cause of peace and the cause of the healthy development
of Europe."
The Anglo-French rulers remained implacable. Qn the next
day, the British Government sent to the Czechoslovak Government a note in reply, suggesting that the latter should withdraw
its answer to the original Anglo-French proposals and "speedily
and seriously weigh the matter" before creating a situation for
which the British Government could take no responsibility. The
British Government further emphasized that it could not believe
that the Czechoslovak proposal of arbitration would now be acceptable. In the opinion of the British Government, the British
note stated, "the German Government does not consider the situation to be such as could be solved by arbitration as suggested by
the Czechoslovak Government." In conclusion, the British note
threateningly warned the Czechoslovak Government "that if
British advice is rejected, the Czechoslovak Government will be
free to take any steps it may deem befitting the situation which
may develop later."
At a conference of Hitler, Chamberlain, Mussolini, and Daladier held in Munich on September 29 and 30, 1938, the disgraceful deal, which had been completely agreed upon in advance among
the chief participants ' in the conspiracy against the peace, was
finally concluded. The fate of Czechoslovakia was decided behind
her back. Representatives of Czechoslovakia were invited to Munich only meekly to await the results of the conspiracy of the imperialists. The entire conduct of Britain and France left no doubt
that this unheard-of act of treachery on the part of the British and
French Governments in regard to the Czechoslovak people and
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republic, far from being a chance episode in the policy of these
States, represented a highly important phase in their policy aimed
at goading the Hitlerite aggressors against the Soviet Union.
The true meaning of the Munich conspiracy was then exposed
by J. V. Stalin who said that "the districts of Czechoslovakia were
yielded to Genpany as the price of undertaking to launch war
on the Soviet U nion."22
The essence of that policy of the Anglo-French ruling circles
of the time was exposed by J. V. Stalin at the Eighteenth Congress
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), in
March, 1939.
.
"The policy of non-intervention means conniving at aggression, giving free rein to war, and consequently transforming
the war into world war. The policy of non-intervention reveals
an eagerness, a desire, not to hinder the aggressors in their
nefarious work: not to hinder Japan, say, from embroiling
herself in a war with China, or better still, with the Soviet
Union; not to hinder Germany, say, from enmeshing herself
in European affairs, from embroiling herself in a war with
the Soviet Union; to allow all belligerents to sink deeply into
the mire of war; to encourage them surreptitiously in this
direction; to allow them to weaken and exhaust one another;
and then, when they have become weak enough, to appear on
the scene with fresh strength, to appear, of course, in 'the
interests of peace', and to dictate conditions to the enfeebled
belligerents. "23
The Munich agreement was met with indignation and emphatic condemnation in the democratic circles of various countries, including the United States of America, Great Britain, and
France. The attitude of these circles toward the Munich treachery
of the Anglo-French rulers may be judged by the statements made,
for instance, by Sayers and Kahn, who in their book The Great
22 Eighteenth Congress of the CPSU
(B) , Stenographic Report, Ogiz,
1939, p. 14.
23 Eighteenth Congress of the CPSU
(B) , Stenographic Report, Ogiz,
1939, p. 13.

24

Conspiracy: the Secret War Against Soviet Russia~ published in the
United States of America, had the following to say about Munich:
"The Governments of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Great
Brit.ain and France signed the Munich Pact-the anti-Soviet
Holy Alliance of which world reaction had been dreaming
since 1918. The Pact left Soviet Russia without allies. The
Franco-Soviet Treaty, cornerstone of European collective security, was dead. The Czech Sudetenland became part of Nazi
Germany. The gates of the East were open wide open for the
Wehrmacht."24

Through all phases of the Czechoslovak drama, the Soviet
Union alone of all the Gr.eat Powers vigorously championed the
independence and national rights of Czechoslovakia. Seeking to
justify themselves in the eyes of public opinion, the Governments
of Great Britain and France hypocritically declared that they did
not know whether or not the Soviet Union would live up to its
pledges, given to Czechoslovakia in accordance with the treaty
of mutual assistance. But this was a deliberate lie, for the Soviet
Government had publicly declared its willingness to stand up
for Czechoslovakia against Germany in accordance with the terms
.of that treaty, which called for simultaneous action on the part
of France in defense of Czechoslovakia. France, however, refused
to discharge her duty.
Notwithstanding all this, the Soviet Government declared on
the eve of the Munich deal that it was in favor of convening an
international conference to render practical . aid to Czechoslovakia
and to take practical measures for the preservation of peace. When
the seizure of Czechoslovakia became an accomplished fact, and
the governments of the imperialist countries, one after another, de.cia red their recognition of the accomplished fact, the Soviet Government, in its note of March 18, branded the seizure of Czechoslovakia by Hitlerite Germany, which was accomplished with the
aid of Britain and France, as a wanton act of violence and aggreSSIon.
In that note, the Soviet Government stressed that by her acts
24
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Germany had created and aggravated the ·menace to universal
peace, had "upset political stability in Central Europe, had increased the elements of the atmosphere of alarm created in Europe
still earlier, and had inflicted a fresh injury to the fee1.ing of
security of nations. "25
But the handing over -of Czechoslovakia to Hitler was not the
end of the business. The Governments of Britain and France were,
each of them, eager to be first to sign broad political agreements
with Hitlerite Germany. The Anglo-German declaration was
signed in Munich on September 30, 1938, by Chamberlain and
Hitler. This declaration said:
.
"We have continued today our conversation and have unanimously come to the conviction that Anglo-German relations are
of paramount importance to both countries and to Europe. We
regard the agreement signed last evening and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as symbolizing. the desire of both our
peoples never again to wage war against each other . We are
resolved to consider other questions, too, which concern both
our countries, by means of consultation and to strive in the
future to eliminate all causes generating discord, so as to facilitate the safeguarding of peace in Europe."26
That was Britain's and Germany's declaration on mutual nonaggression. The Bonnet-Ribbentrop Franco-German declaration,
similar to the Anglo·- German one, was signed on December 6,
1938. It stated that the German and French Governments were
unanimous in their belief that peaceful and good-neighborly relations between Germany and France constitute the most essential
condition for the consolidation of relations in Europe, and for
maintenance of the general peace, and that both Governments will
do their utmost to secure the preservation of such relations b~tween
their countries. The declaration further asserted that between
France and Germany there were no longer any controversial questions of a territorial nature, and that the then existing boundary
between the two countries was final.
2fi
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Deutsch-Englische El'klal'ung, Munchen, September 30, 1938, Archiv

fur Aussenpolitik und Landerkunde, April 1938-Marz 1939, S. 483.

26

The declaration concluded by saying that both Governments
were firmly resolved, without reference to their specific relations
with third Powers, to maintain contact with each other on all
matters concerning their countries, and to confer with each other
should later development of these matters lead to international
complications.
That was France's and Germany's declaration on mutual nonaggression. Essentially, these agreements meant that both Britain
and France concluded non-aggression pacts with Hitler. These
agreements with Hitlerite Germany revealed with perfect clarity
that the British and French Governments, in their desire to ward
off the menace of Hitlerite aggression from their countries, believed that the Munich agreement and similar other ones flung the
gates wide open for Hitlerite aggression in the East, aggression
against the Soviet Union. It was thus that the political conditions
for "uniting Europe without Russia" were created. What they
were after was the complete isolation of the Soviet Union.
3. The Isolation of the Soviet Union. The Soviet-German NonAggression Pact

of Czechoslovakia fascist Germany proceeded
A withtheherseizure
preparations for war quite openly, before the eyes
FTER

of the whole world. Hitler, encouraged by Britain and France,
no longer stood on ceremony or pretended to favor the peaceful
settlement of European problems. The most dramatic months of
the prewar period had come. At that time it was already clear
that every day was bringing mankind nearer to the unparalleled
catastrophe of war.
What was, at that time, the policy of the Soviet Union on the
one hand, and of Great Britain and France on the other?
The attempt of the falsifiers of history in the United States of
America to avoid answering this question merely goes to prove
that their consciences are not clear.
The truth is that even during the fatal period of the spring
and summer of 1939, on the threshold of war, Britain and
France, supported by ruling circles in the United States, continued
the former course of their policy. This was a policy of provocative
incitement of Hitler Germany against the Soviet Union, camou..
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Raged not only with pharisaical phrases about their readiness to
cooperate with the Soviet Union, but also with certain simple
diplomatic maneuvers intended to conceal the real character of
their policy from world public opinion.
Among such maneuvers were, in the first place, the '1939 negotiations which Britain and France decided to open with the Soviet
Union. In order to deceive public opinion, the ruling circles in
Britain and France tried to depict these negotiations as a serious
attempt to prevent the further extension of Hitlerite aggression.
In the light of all the subsequent developments, however, it became perfectly clear that so far as the Anglo-French side was
concerned, these negotiations were from the very beginning nothing but another move in their double game.
This was also clear to the leaders of Hitler Germany, for whom
the meaning of the negotiations with the Soviet Union, undertaken by the Governments of Britain and France, was certainly
no secret. Here, for example, is what the German Ambassador
to London, Dirksen, wrote in his report to the German Foreign
Ministry on August 3, 1939, as is evident from documents captured by the Soviet Army during the defeat of Hitler Germany:
"The prevailing impression ' here was that [Britain's] ties
with other states formed during the recent months were only a
reserve means for a real reconciliation with Germany and that
these ties would cease to exist as soon as the one' important aim,
worthy of effort-an agreement with Germany-was achieved."
This opinion was firmly shared by all German diplomats who
watched the situation in London.
In another secret report to Berlin, Dirksen wrote:
"By means of armaments and the acquisition of allies, Britain wants to gain strength and to catcn up with the Axis, but at
the same time she wants to try to reach an amicable agreement
with Germany by means of negotiations." 27
The slanderers and falsifiers of history are trying to keep these
documents hidden since they shed a bright light on the situation
during the last prewar months, without correct assessment of
27 Dirksen's memorandum On the Development of Political Relations
between Germany and Britain during my Term of Office in LondQn, compiled in September 1939.

which it would be impossible to understand the true prehistory of
the war. By undertaking negotiations with the Soviet Union and
giving guarantees to Poland, Romania and certain other states,
Britain and France, with the support of the ruling circles in the
United States, played a double game calculated to lead to an
agreement with Hitler Germany, for the purpose of directing her
aggression to the East, against the Soviet Union.
The negotiations between Britain and France on the one hand,
and the Soviet Union on the other, began in March, 1939, and
continued for about four month's.
The whole course of these negotiations showed with perfect
clarity that whereas the Soviet Union was trying to reach a broad
agreement with the Western Powers on the basis of equality,
.an agreement capable of preventing Germany, even though at the
last 'moment, from starting a war in Europe, the Governments of
Britain and France, relying on support in the United States, set
themselves entirely different aims. The ruling circles in Britain
and France, accustomed to having others pull their chestnuts out
of the fire, on this occasion too attempted to foist obligations upon
the Soviet Union under which the USSR would have taken upon
itself the brunt of the sacrifice in repulsing a possible Hitler aggression, while Britain and France would not bind themselves by
any commitment to the Soviet Union.
If the rulers of Britain and France had succeeded in ' this
maneuver they would have come much closer to attaining their
basic aim, which was to get Germany and the Soviet Union to
come to grips as quickly as possible. The Soviet Government, however, saw through this scheme, and at all stages in the negotiations
it countered the diplomatic trickery and subterfuges of the Western Powers with its clear and frank proposals intended to serve
but one purpose-the safeguarding of peace in Europe.
There is no need to recall all the vicissitudes through which
the negotiations went. We need only bring to mind a few of the
more important points. It suffices to recall the terms put forward
during the negotiations by the Soviet Government: the conclusion
of an effective pact of mutual assistance against aggression between
Britain, France, and the USSR; the granting of a guarantee by
Britain, France, and the USSR to states of Central and Eastern
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Europe, including all the European countries bordering on the
USSR, without exception; the conclusion of a concrete military
agreement between Britain, France, and the USSR on the forms
and volume of immediate effective aid to each other and to the
guaranteed states in the ~vent of an attack by aggressors. 28
At the Third Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on
May 31, 1939, V. M. Molotov pointed out that some of the
Anglo-French proposals moved during those negotiations had contained none of the ~lementary principles of reciprocity and equality of obligations, indispensable for all agreements between equals.
"While guaranteeing themselves," said V. M. Molotov, "from
direct attack on the part of aggressors by mutual assistance pacts
between themselves and with Poland and while trying to secure
for themselves the assistance of the USSR in the event of an at-'
tack by aggressors on Poland and Romania, the British and French
left open the question of whether the USSR in its turn might
count on their assistance in the event of its being directly attacked by aggressors, just as they left open another question,
namely, whether they could participate in guaranteeing the small
states bordering on the USSR and covering its northwestern
frontier, should these states prove unable to defend their neutrality
from attack by aggressors. Thus, the position was one of inequality
for the USSR."
Even when the British and French representatives gave verbal
consent to the principle of mutual assistance on terms of reciprocity between Britain, France, and the USSR in the event of a
direct attack by an aggressor, they hedged it in with a number
of reservations which rendered this consent fictitious.
In addition to this, the Anglo-French proposals provided for
help on the part of the USSR to those countries to which the
British and French had given promises of guarantees, but they
said nothing about their own help for the countries on the northwestern frontier of the USSR, the Baltic States, in the event of an
aggressor attacking them. ·
In view of the above-mentioned considerations. V. M. Molotov announced that th~ Soviet Union could not undertake obliga28 Report by V. M. Molotov to the Third Session of the Supreme Soviet
of the USSR, May 31, 1939.
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tions with respect to some countri~s unless similar guarantees \yere
given with respect to the countries situated on the northwestern
frontier of the Soviet Union.
It should also be remembered that when, on March 18, 1939,
Seeds, the British Ambassador to Moscow, asked the People's
Commissar of Foreign Affairs 'W-hat the , Soviet Union's position
would be in the event of Hitler's aggression against Romaniaconcerning the preparation of which the British possessed information-and when the question was then raised by the Soviet side
as to what Britain's position would be under those circumstances,
Seeds evaded reply, stating that Romania was geographically
closer to the Soviet Union than it was to England.
Thus, from the very first step, it was already quite clear that
British ruling circles were endeavoring to bind the Soviet Union to
definite obligations, while they themselves would stand aloof. This
artless method ~as then again and again repeated regularly througout the whole course of the negotiations.
In reply to the British inquiry, the Soviet Government suggested
that a conference be called of representatives of the most interested
states-namely Great Britain, France, Romania, Poland, Turkey,
and the Soviet Union. In the opinion of the Soviet Government,
such a conference would offer the best opportunities for ascertaining the real state of affairs and for determining the positions of all
the participants. The British Government, however, replied that
it believed the Soviet proposal to be premature.
Instead of calling a conference which would have made it possible to agree on concrete measures to combat aggression, the British
Government on March 21, 1939 proposed to the Soviet Government the signing, together with it as well as with France and
Poland, a declaration in which the signatory governments would
undertake to "consult together as to what steps should be taken to
offer joint resistance" in the event of a threat to "the independence
of any European state."
In arguing that this proposal was acceptable, the British Ambassador laid particular emphasis 'on the point that the declaration
was couched in terms which involved hardly any commitments.
It was quite obvious that such a declaration could not s,erve as
an effective means of fighting the impending threat on the part of
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the aggressor. Believing, however, that even a declaration promising
so little might constitute at least some step forward in the matter
of 'c urbing the aggressor, the Soviet Government consented to the
British proposal. But already on April), 1939 the British Ambassador in Moscow communicated the information that Britain
considered the question of a joint declaration as having lapsed.
After two more weeks of procrastination, the British Foreign
Secretary, Halifax, thro,:!gh the medium of the Ambassador in
Moscow, made another proposal to the Soviet Government to the
effect that the Soviet Government should issue a declaration saying
that "in the event of an act of aggression against any Europeanneighbor of the Soviet Union, who would offer resistance, the
assistance of the Soviet Government could be counted upon if
desired."
What this proposal meant was mainly that in the event of an
act of aggression on the part of Germany against Latvia, Lithuania,
Estonia, or Finland, the Soviet Union would be obliged to render
them assistance without any obligation on the part of Britain to
render assistance-i.e., for the Soviet Union to become involved in
a war with Germany singlehanded. In the case of Poland_ and
Romania, too, who did receive Britain's guarantees, the Soviet
Union was to ren~er them assistance against an aggressor; but
even in their case Britain refused to assume any obligations jointly
with the Soviet U nion,- leaving herself a free hand and a field for
maneuvers of any kind, not to mention the fact that, according to
this proposal, Poland and -Romania as well as the Baltic States
assumed no obligations whatever with respect to the USSR.
The Soviet Government, however, did not want to miss any
opp0t:tunity to bring about agreement with other Powers for a joint struggle against Hitler's aggression. Without the least delay it
presented to the British Government its counterproposal which
consisted of the following:
( 1) That the Soviet Union, Britain and France should mutually
undertake to render one another immediate assistance of every
kind, including military, in the event of aggression against one of
these states;
(2) That the Soviet Union, Britian, and France should undertake to render any kind of assistance, including military, to
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the states of Eastern Europe situated between the Baltic and the
Black Seas and bordering on the Soviet Union, in the event of
aggression against these states; and
(3) The Soviet Union, Britain and France were to undertake to determine within a short space of time the volume and
forms of military assistance to be rendered to each of these
states in both cases mentioned above.
These were the most important points of the ' Soviet proposal.
It is not hard to see that there was a fundamental difference between the Soviet and British proposals, inasmuch as the Soviet
proposal provided for really effective measures for joint counteraction to aggression.
No reply to that proposal came from the British Government
for three weeks. This caused growing anxiety in Britian, owing
to which the British Government felt constrained in the end
to resort to a new maneuver in order to deceive public opinion.
On May 8 the British reply, or, to be more exact the British
counterproposals, were received in Moscow. It was again proposed that the Soviet Government should make a unilateral
declaration in which it "would undertake that in the event of
Great Britain and France being involved in hostilities in fulfillment of these obligations" [to Belgium, Poland, Romania, Greece,
and Turkey] "tlie assistance of the Soviet Government would
be immediately available if desired and would be afforded in such
manner and on such terms as might be agreed."
Once again the Soviet Union was expected to assume unilateral
obligations. It was to undertake to render assistance to Britain
and -France who on their part assumed no obligations whatever to the Soviet Union with regard to the Baltic Republics.
Britain thus suggested that the USSR be placed in an unequal
position, unacceptable 'to and incompatible with the dignity of
any independent state.
It is easy to see that actually the British proposal was addressed not so much to Moscow as to Berlin. The Germans
were inyited to attack the Soviet Union, and were given to
unoerstand that Britain and France would maintain neutrality
if only the Germans attacked through the Baltic States.
On May 11 the negotiations between the Soviet Union, Britain,
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and France w~re further complicated by a statement made by the
Polish Ambassador in Moscow, Grzybowski, to the effect that
"Poland does not consider it possible to conclude a pact of mutual
assistance with the USSR. . ."
Naturally, such a statement could only be made by the Polish
representative with the knowledge and approval of the ruling
circles of Britian and France.
The behavior of the British and French representatives in the
Moscow negotiations was so provocative that even in the ruling
camp of the Western Powers there were some who sharply
criticized this crude game. Thus, Lloyd George published a
sharp article in the French newspaper Ce Soir in the summer of
1939 directed · against the makers of British policy. Referring
to the causes of the endless procrastination in which the negotiations between Britain and France on the one hand, and the
Soviet Union on the other, were stuck, Lloyd George wrote
that there could be only one answer to that question: "Neville
Chamberlain, Halifax, and John Simon do not want any agreement with Russia whatever."
It goes without saying that what was obvious to Lloyd
George was no less obvious to the bosses of Hitler Germany, who
understood perfectly that the Western Powers had no intention
of reaching a serious agreement with the Soviet Union, but were
pursuing an entirely different aim. That aim was to spur Hitler
on to hurry with his attack upon the Soviet Union, guaranteeing
him a premium, as it were, for such an attack by placing the
Soviet Union in the least favorable conditions in the event of
a war with Germany.
Furthermore, the Western Powers dragged out the negotatiops
with the Soviet Union endlessly, seeking to drown major issues
in a swamp of minor amendments and innumerable versions.
Each time the question of some real obligations came up, the
representatives of these Powers pretended not to understand
what it was all about.
Toward the end of May, Britain and France made new proposals which somewhat improved the previous version, but still
left open a question of essential importance to the Soviet Union
-namely, the question of guarantees for the three Baltic Re-
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publics situated on the northwestern frontier of the Soviet Union.
Thus, the rulers of Britain and France, while making certain
verbal concessions under the pressure of public opinion in their
countries, stuck to their previous line and hedged in their proposals with such reservations as they knew would make them
unacceptable to the -Soviet Union.
The behavior of the British and French representatives in
the negotiations at Moscow was so intolerable that on May 27,
1939, V. M. Molotov had to tell British Ambassador Seeds and
French Charge d'Affairs Payard that their draft agreement for
joint counteraction to an aggressor in Europe did not contain
a plan for the organization of effective mutual assistance of the
USSR, Britain, and France, and that it did not even indicate that
the British and French Governments were seriously interested
in a corresponding pact with the Soviet Union.
I t was further plainly stated that the Anglo-French proposal
led one to think that the Governments of Britain and France
were not- so much interested in the pact itself as in talk about
a pact. Possibly Britain and France needed this talk for some
aims of their own. The Soviet Government did not know what
these aims were. The Soviet Government was interested, not
in talk about a pact, but in organizing effective mutual assistance of the USSR, Britain, and France against aggression
in Europe. The British and French representatives were warned
that the Soviet Government did not intend to take part in talk
about a pact, the aim of which the USSR did not know, and
that the British and French Governments might find more
suitable partners for such talk than the USSR.
The Moscow negotiations dragged on endlessly. The London
Times blurted out the reasons for this inadmissible procrastination when it wrote:
"A hard and fast alliance with Russia would hamper other
negotiations." 29
In referring to "other negotiations" the Times apparently implied the negotiations which Robert Hudson, Minister of Overseas
Trade, was conducting with Dr. Helmut Wohltat, Hitler's
,
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economic adviser, on the possibility of a very large British loan
to Hitler Germany, of which more anon. Besides, as is known
from press reports, on the ,day that Hitler's army entered Prague,
a delegation of the Federation of British Industries conducted
negotiations in Dusseldorf with a view to concluding an extensive agreement with big German industries.
A circumstance that attracted attention at the time was that
men of secondary importance were sent to conduct the negotiations on behalf of Great Britain in Moscow, while Chamberlain
himself went to Germany to carryon negotiations with Hitler,
and that on several occasions. It is also important to note that
the British representative for the negotiations with the USSR,
Strang, had no authority to sign any agreement with the Soviet
Union.
In view of the demand of the Soviet Union that the parties
should proceed to concrete negotiations concerning measures
to fight a possible aggressor, the Governments of Britain and
France had to consent to send their military missions to Moscow.
But it took those missions an unusually long time to get to Moscow, and when they did get there, it transpired that they were
composed of men of secondary importance who, furthermore,
had not been authorized to sign any agreement. That being the
case, the military negotiations proved to be as futile as the
political ones.
The military missions of the Western Powers demonstrated at
once that they even had no desire to carryon serious conversations concerning means of mutual assistance in the event of
aggression on the part of Germany. The Soviet military mission
proceeded from the fact that, since the USSR had no common
border with Germany, it could render Britain, France, 'and Poland assistance in the event of war only if Soviet troops were
permitted to pass through Polish territority. The Polish Government, however, declared that it would accept no milita,r y assistance
from the Soviet Union, thus showing that it feared the growth
of strength of the Soviet Union more than Hitler's aggression.
Both the British and French missions supported Poland's position.
In the course of the military negotiations, the question also
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came up as to the strength of the armed forces which should be
put in the field at once by the parties to the agreement in the
event of aggression. The British named a ridiculous figure, stating
that they could put in the field five infantry divisions and one
mechanized division. That was what the British offered at a
time when the Soviet Union declared that it was prepared to
send to the front against the aggressor one hundred and thirty. six divisions, five thousand medium and heavy guns, up to ten
thousand tanks and whippets, more than five thousand war planes,
etc. The above shows with what an utter lack: of seriousness the
British Government treated the negotiations for a military
agreement with the USSR.
The facts cited above fully bear out the conclusion that suggests itself, and this conclusion is as follows:
( 1 ) Throughout the negotiations the Soviet Government
strove with the utmost patience to secure agreement with Britain
and France for mutual assistance against an aggressor on a basis
of equality and on the condition that the mutual assistance
would be really effective, i.e., that the signing of a political
agreement would be accompanied by the signing of a military
convention establishing the volume, form"s, and time limits of the
assistance, as all the preceding events had shown clearly enough
that only such an agreement could be effective and might brinO
g
the Hitlerite aggressQr to his senses, encouraged though he was
by complete impunity and by the connivance of the Western
B wers during the course of many years.
(2) Britain's and France's behavior during the negotiations
with the Soviet Vnion fully confirmed that a serious agreement was farthest from their thoughts, since British and French
policy was guided by other aims which had nothing in common with the interests of peace and the fight against aggression.
(3) The perfidious purpose of Anglo-French policy was to
give Hitler to understand that the USSR had no allies, that
the USSR was isolated, that h~ could attack: the USSR without
running the risk: of encountering the resistance of Britain and
France.
It was no wonder, therefore, that Anglo-French-Soviet negotia tions ended in failure.
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There was, of course, nothing fortuitious about that failure.
I t was becoming ever more obvious that the breakdown of the
negotiations had been planned beforehand by the representatives
of the Western Powers in their double game. The point was that,
along with open negotiation with the USSR, the British conducted backstage negotiations with Germany" and they attached
incomparably greater importance to the latter.
Whereas, by their negotiations in Moscow, the ruling circles
of the Western Powers sought primarily to lull the vigilance
of the public in their countries, to deceive the peoples that were
being drawn into war, the negotiations with the Hiderites were
of an entirely different nature.
The program of the Anglo-German negotiations was formulated
plainly enough by the British Foreign Secretary, Halifax, who was
addressing unequivocal appeals to Hitler Germany at the very time
his officials continued negotiations in Moscow. In a speech at a
banquet of The Royal Institute of International Affairs on
June 29, 1939, Halifax expressed a readiness to come to terms with
Germany on all the problems "that are today causing wo~ld
anxiety." He said:
"In such a new atmosphere we could examine the colonial
problem, the problem of raw materials, trade barriers, the issue
of Lebensraum" the limitation of armaments and any other issue
that affects the lives of all European citizens."3o
If we recall how the conservative Daily Mail which is close
to Halifax, treated the problem of Lebensraum as far back s
1933 when it suggested to the H _itlerites that they should wrest
Lebensraum from the USSR, there remains not the slightest
doubt as to what Halifax really meant. It was an open offer to
Hitler Gennany to come to terms for a division of the world and
of the spheres of influence, an offer to settle all the questions
without the Soviet Union and mainly at the expense of the
Soviet Union.
As early as June, 1939, British representatives inaugurated
strictly confidential negotiations with Germany through Hitler's
Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, Wohltat, who had come
80
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to London. Conversations were carried on with him by the Minister of Overseas Trade, Hudson, and Chamberlain's closest adviser,
G. Wilson. The substance of those June negotiations ' is still
buried in the recesses of diplomatic archives. But in July, Wohltat
paid another visit to London and the negotiations were resumed.
The contents of that second round of negotiations are now
known from captured German documents in the hands of the
Soviet Government, which will soon be made public.
Hudson and G. Wilson suggested to Wohltat, and later to
the German Ambassador in London, Dirksen, the starting of
secret negotiations for a broad agreement, which was to include
an agreement for the division of spheres of influence on a
world-wide scale, and for the .elimination of "deadly competition
in the general markets." It was envisaged that Germany 'w ould
be allowed predominating influence in southeastern' Europe. In
a report to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated
July 21, 1939, Dirksen pointed out that the program discussed
by W ohltat and Wilson comprised political, military, and ecomonic issues. Among the political issues a special place, along
with a pact of non-aggression, was assigned to a pact of nonintervention which was to provide for a "delimitation of Lebensraum between the great Powers, particularly between Britain
and Germany." 31
During the discussion of the questions involved in these two
pacts, the British representatives promised that, in the event
these pacts were signed, Britain would renounce the guarantees
she had just given Poland.
In case an Anglo-German agreement was signed, the British
were prepared to let the Germans settle the Danzig problem and that of the Polish Corridor with Poland alone, undertaking not to interfere in the settlement.
Further-and this too finds a documentary confirmation in
Dirksen's reports which will shortly be published-Wilson reaffirmed that in case the abovementioned pacts between Britain
and Germany were signed, the British policy of giving guarantees
would be virtually abolished.
11 Memorandum of the German Ambassador
to Britain, Dirksen, of
July 21, 1939. Archives of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
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"Then Poland," says Dirksen on this point in his report,
"would be left, so to say, alone, !ace to face with Germany."
All this meant that the rulers of Britain were prepared to
surrender Poland to Hitler as his prey, at a time when the ink
with which Britain's guarantees to Poland had been signed
had not dried. At the same time, if the Anglo-German agree:..
ment had been concluded, the purpose which Britain and France
had set themselves in starting the negotiations with the Soviet
Union would have been achieved and the possibility of expediting a clash between Germany and the USSR ·w ould have been
further facilitated.
.
Lastly, it was proposed to supplement the political agreement
between Britain and Germany by an economic agreement which
would include a secret deal on colonial questions, on the distribution of raw materials, on the division of markets, as well
as on a big British loan for Germany.
Thus, the rulers of Britain saw an alluring picture of a stable
agreement with Germany and the so-called "canalization" of
German aggression toward the East, against Poland to whom
they had but recently given a "guarantee" and against the Soviet
Union.
Is it to be wondered at that the slanderers and falsifiers of history carefully hush up and try to conceal these facts of decisive
importance to an understanding of the situation in which war
was thus becoming inevitab e?
By this time there was -already no doubt left that, far from intending to make any serious attempt to prevent Hitler Germany from starting the war, Britain and France, on the contrary, were doing everything within their power, by means
of secret deals and agreements, by means of every possible kind
of provocation, to incite Hitler Germany against the Soviet Union.
No forgers will ever succeed in wiping from history or from
the consciousness of the peoples the decisive fact that under
these conditions, the Soviet Union faced the alternative: either
to accept, for purposes of self defense, Germany's proposal to
conclude a non-aggression pact and t~ereby to ensure to the
Soviet Union the prolongation of peace for a certain period of
time~ which might be used by the Soviet State better to prepare
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its forces for resistance to a possible attack on the part of an
aggressor; or to reject Germany's proposal for a non-aggression
pact and thereby to permit war provocateurs from the camp
of the Western Powers immediately to involve the Soviet Union
in armed conflict with Germany at a time when the situation was
utterly unfavorable to the Soviet Union and when it was
completely isolated.
In this situation, the Soviet Government found itself com- .
pelled to make its choice and conclude a non-aggression pact
with Germany.
This choice was a wise and far-sighted act of Soviet foreign
policy under the conditions which then obtained. This step
of the Soviet Government to an enormous extent predetermined
the favorable outcome of the Second World War for the Soviet
Union and for all the freedom-loving peoples.
I t would be a gross slander to assert that the conclusion of
a pact with the Hitlerites was part of the plan of the foreign policy
of the USSR. On the contrary, the USSR strove at all times to
have an agreement with the Western non-aggressive states
against the German and Italian aggressors for the achievement
of collective security on the basis of equality. But there must
be two parties to an agreement.
Whereas the USSR insisted on an agreement for combating
aggression, Britain and France systematically rejected it, preferring to pursue a policy of isolating the USSR, a policy of
concessions t~ the aggressors, a policy of directing aggression
to the East, against the USSR.
The United States of America, far from counteracting that
ruinous policy, backed it in every way. As for the American
billionaires, they went on investing their capital in German heavy
industrie~, helping the Germans to expand .their war industries,
and thu~ supplying German aggression with arms. They might
as well be saying: "Go on, Messrs. Europeans, wage war to
your hearts' content; wage war with God's help; while we,
modest American billionaires, will accumulate wealth out of your
war, making hundreds 'of millions of dollars in super-profits."
Naturally, with this state ~of affairs in Europe, there only
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remained one way out for the Soviet Union: to accept the
German proposal for a pact. This was, after all, the best of all
the possible ways out.
Just as in 1918, owing to the hostile policy of the Western
Powers, the Soviet Union was forced to conclude the Brest
Peace with the Germans, so in 1939, twenty years after the
Peace of Brest, the Soviet Union was compelled to conclude
a pact with the Germans, owing to the same hostile policy of
Britain and France.
The claptrap of slanderers of all hues to the effect that the
- USSR should in no case have allowed itself to conclude a
pact with the Germans can only be regarded as ridiculous. Why
could Poland, who had Britain and France as allies, conclude
a non-aggression pact with Germany in 1934, and the Soviet
Union, enjoying less favorable conditions, could not conclude
a similar pact in 1939? Why could Britain and France, who
were the dominant force in Europe, issue jointly with the Germans a declaration on non-aggression in 1938, and the Soviet
Union, isolated because of the hostile policy of Britain and France,
could not conclude a .pact with the Germans?
Is it not a fact that of all the non-aggressive great Powers in
Europe the Soviet Union was the last to make a pact with the
Germans?
Of course, the falsifiers of history and other reactionaries are
displeased with the fact that the Soviet Union succeeded ' in
making _good use of the Soviet-German pact to strengthen its
defenses; that it succeeded in moving its frontiers far to the
West and in barring the way of the unhampered eastward advance of German aggression; that Hitler's troops had to begin
their offensive to the East, not from the N arva-Minsk-Kiev
line, but from a line hundreds of kilometers farther west; that
the USSR ,,-as not bled to death in the Patriotic War, but
emerged victorious· from that war. This displeasure, however,
•
should be regarded as a manifestation of tile impotent rage of
bankrupt politicians.
The vicious displeasuure of these gentlemen can only be regarded as a demonstration of the indubitable fact that the policy
of the Soviet Union has been and remains a correct policy.
42

4. The ,Creation of An "Eastern" Front, Germany's Attack
Upon The USSR; The Anti-Hitler Coalition and The Question of
Inter-Allied Obligations.

concluding the pact of non-aggression with Germany
W in August,
1939, the Soviet Union did not doubt for a moHEN

ment that sooner or later Hitler would attack: it. This certainty
was based on the fundamental political and . military policies of
the Hitlerites. It was borne out by the practical activities of
the Hitler Government throughout the pr{!war period.
That was why the first task of the Soviet Government was
to create an "Eastern" front against Hitler's aggression, to
build up a defense line along the western frontiers of the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Republics and thus to set up a barrier
to prevent an unhindered advance of the German troops eastward.
To do this it was necessary to reunite Western Byelorussia and
Western Ukraine which the Poland of the .gentry had seized
in 1920, with Soviet Byelorussia and the Soviet Ukraine, and
to move Soviet troops there. This matter brooked no delay as
the poorly equipped Polish troops proved to be unstable, the
Polish command and the Polish Government were .already in full
flight, and Hitler's troops, meeting no serious obstacles, could
occupy the Byelorussian and Ukrainian territories before Soviet
troops got there.
On September 17, 1939, the Soviet troops, at the order of
the Soviet Government, crossed the prewar Soviet-Polish border,
occupied Western Byelorussia and Western Ukraine and proceeded to build defenses there along the western line of the
Ukrainian and Byelorussian territories. In the main, it was the
line which is know in hstory as the "Curzon Line" established
at the Versailles Conference of the Allies.
A few days later the Soviet Government signed pacts of
mutual assistance with the Baltic States, providing for the
stationing of Soviet Army garrisons on the territory of Estonia,
Latvia, and · Lithuania, the organization of Soviet air fields and
the building of naval bases there.
Thus the foundation was· laid for the "Eastern" front.
It was not hard to see that the creation of an "Eastern" front
was an important contribution not only to the organization of
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the security of the USSR but to the common cause of the peaceloving states that were fighting against Hitler's aggression. N evertheless, the answer of Anglo-Franco-American circles, in their
overwhelming majority, to this step of the Soviet Government
was to start a malicious anti-Soviet campaign, describing the
Soviet action as aggression.
There were some political leaders, however, sufficiently discerning to understahd the meaning of the Soviet policy and to
. admit that it was the right thing to create an "Eastern" front.
First among them was Mr. Churchill, then First Lord of the
Admiralty, who in his radio speech on October 1, 1939, after
a number of unfriendly sallies against the Soviet Union, stated:
"That the Russian armies should stand on this line was
clearly necessary for the safety of Russia against the Nazi
menace. At any rate, the line is there and an Eastern front
has been created which Nazi Germany does not dare assail.
When Herr von Ribbentrop was summoned to Moscow last
week, it was to learn the fact and to accept the fact that the
Nazi designs upon the Baltic States and upon the Ukraine
must come to a dead stop."
While the situation with regard to the security of the USSR
was more or less satisfactory on the western frontiers, at a considerable distance from Moscow, Minsk, and Kiev, the same
could not be said about the northern frontier of the USSR. Here,
at a distance of some 32 kilometers from Leningrad, stood Finnish troops, the majority of whose commanding officers oriented
themselves toward Hitler Germany. The Soviet Government
was well aware of the fact that the fascist elements among the
ruling circles of Finland, who were closely connected with the
Hitlerites and who wielded strong influence in the Finnish Army,
were striving to capture Leningrad. The fact that Halder, the
Chief of the General Staff of Hitler's Army, arrived in the summer of 1939 in Finland to instruct the highest leaders of the
Finnish Army, could not be regarded as a mere accident. There
could hardly be any doubt that the leading circles of Finland
were in league with the Hitlerites, that they wanted to turn Finland into a springboard for Hitler Germany's attack upon the
USSR.
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I t is therefore not surprising that all the attempts of the USSR
to find a common language with the Finnish Government with a
view to improving relations between the two countries remained
futile.
The Government of Finland declined, one after another, all
the friendly proposals of the Soviet Government, the purpose of
which was to guarantee the security of the USSR, particularly
of Leningrad-and this in spite of the fact that the Soviet Union
was willing to meet Finland halfway and to satisfy her legitimate
interests.
The Finnish Government declined the proposal of the USSR
to move the Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus a few dozen
kilometers, although the Soviet Government was willing to compensate Finland with an area twice as large in 'Soviet Karelia.
The· Finnish Government also declined the proposal of the
USSR to conclude a pact of mutual assistance, thereby demonstrating that the security of the USSR from the direction of Finland remained unguaranteed.
By these and similar hostile actions and provocations on the
Soviet-Finnish border, Finland unleashed the war against the
Soviet Union.
The results of the Soviet-Finnish War are known. The frontiers of the USSR in the northwest and particularly in the Leningrad area were shifted further away and the security of the
USSR was strengthened. This played an important part in the
defense of the Soviet Union against Hitler's aggression, inasmuch as Hitler Germany and her Finnish accomplices had to
begin their offensive in the northwest of the USSR, not in close
proximity to Leningrad, but from a line nearly 150 kilometers
to the northwest of it.
In his speech at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
on March 29, 1940, V. M. Molotov said:
". . . the Soviet Union having smashed the Finnish Army
and having had every opportunity to occupy the whole of Finland did not do so and did not demand any indemnities for
her war expenditure, as any other Power would have done,
but confined her demands to a minimum.
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" ... We pursued no other object in the Peace Treaty than
that of safeguarding the security of Leningrad, M urmansk,
and the Murmansk Railway."
I t should be noted that although by their whole policy with
regard to the USSR the Finnish ruling circles played into the
hands of Hitler Germany, the Anglo-French bosses of the League
of Nations immediately took the side of the Finnish Government, declared through the League of Nations that the USSR
was the "aggressor" and thereby openly approved and supported
the war which the Finnish rulers had started against the Soviet
Union. At the bidding of its Anglo-French bosses, the League of
Nations, whiCh had disgraced itself by its connivance with and
encouragement of the Japanese and German-Italian aggressors,
obediently passed a resolution against the Soviet Union and
demonstratively "expelled" the latter from its midst.
But matters did not end there. In the war which the Finnish
reactionaries started against the Soviet Union, Britain and France
rendered the Finnish militarists every kind of assistance. The
Anglo-French ruling circles kept inciting the Finnish Government
to continue hostilities.
The British and French rulers systematically supplied Finland
with arms, and made energetic preparations to dispatch to Finland an expeditionary corps a hundred thousand strong.
In the three months that had passed since the beginning of the
war, Britain, according to a statement made by Chamberlain in
the House of Commons on March 19, 1940, delivered to Finland 101 airplanes, over 200 artillery pieces, hundreds of thousands of shells, aerial bombs and anti-tank mines. At the same
time Daladier reported to the Chamber of Deputies that France
had sent to Finland 175 airplanes, about 500 artillery' pieces,
over 5,000 machine guns, 1,000,000 shells and hand grenades and
various other arms.
An exhaustive idea of the plans of the British and French Governments at that time may be obtained from a memorandum
handed by the British to the Swedes on March 2, 1940, which
read:
.
"The Allied Governments understand that the military position of Finland is becoming desperate. After carefully con46
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sidering all the possibilities, they have reached the conclusion
that the only means by which they can render effective help
to Finland is by the dispatch of an Allied force, and they are
prepared to send such a force in response to a Finnish appeal. "32
At that time, as Chamberlain stated in the House of Commons
on March 19,
"Preparations for the expedition were carried on with all
rapidity and at the beginning of March the expedition was
ready to leave. . . . two months before Mannerheim had asked
for it to arrive."
Chamberlain added that this force reached 100,000 men in
strength.
At the sar:ne ~ime, the French Government was prepanng an
expeditionary corps of 50,000 men-the first of a series-to be
sent to Finland via N arvik.
The British and French rulers were engaged in these bellicose
activities at a time when Britain and France were absolutely inactive on the front against Hitler Germany, at the time of "the
phony war," as it was called .
.But the military assistance to Finland against the Soviet Union
was only part of a broader scheme of the British and French imperialists.
.
The above-mentioned' "White Paper" of the Swedish Ministry
of Foreign Affairs contains a document penned by the Swedish
Minister of Foreign Affairs Guenther. In this document we
read that:
"The dispatch of this force was part of the general plan of an
attack upon the Soviet Union" and that beginning March 15,
this plan "will be put into effect against Baku and still earlier
through Finland. "33
Henri de Kerillis, in his book, DeGaulle Dictateur wrote the
following about that plan:
J

J
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"According to this plan, the main features of which were
explained to me by Paul Reynaud 34 in a letter which is ·in my
possession, the motorized expeditionary corps, after landing
in Finland through Norway, would quickly disperse Russia's
disorganized hordes and would march on ~eningrad . . ." 35
In France this plan was drawn up by DeGaulle and General
Weygand, who was then in command of the French troops in
Syria, and who boasted that
"with certain reinforcements and 200 airplanes he would seize
the Caucasus and enter into Russia as a knife enters into butter."
It is also known that in 1940 the French General Gamelin
worked out a plan for military operations to be conducted by the
British and French against the · USSR, in which special attention was given to bombing Baku and Batumi.
The preparations of the British and French rulers for an attack
upon the USSR went on full blast. The General Staffs. of Britain
and France were diligently drawing up plans for such an attack.
Instead of waging war against ' Hitler Germany ~ these gentlemen
wanted to start war against the Soviet Union.
But those plans were not fated to materialize. At this time
Finland was defeated by the Soviet troops and was forced to sur. render, in spite of all the efforts of Britain and France to prevent her capitulation .
. On March 12, 1940, the Soviet-Finnish Peace Treaty was
signed.
Thus the defense of the USSR against Hitlerite aggression
was strengthened also in the north, in the Leningrad area, where
the defense line was shifted to a distance of 150 kilometers north
of Leningrad with Vyborg included.
But this did not yet mean that the formation of an "Eastern"
front from the Baltic to the Black Sea had been completed. Pacts
had been concluded with the Baltic States, but there were as yet
no Sovi~t troops there capable of holding the defenses. Moldavia
and Bukovina had formally been reunited with the USSR, but
Then a member of the French Government.
Henri de Kerillis, De Gaulle, Dictateut'. Montreal, Edition Beauchemin, 1945, pp. 363-364.
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there too, there were still no Soviet troops capable of holding the
defenses. In the middle of June, 1940, Soviet troops entered
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. On June 27, 1940, Soviet troops
entered Bukovina and Moldavia. The latter had been severed by
Romania from the USSR after the October Revolution.
Thus the formation of an "Eastern" front against Hitlerite
aggression from the Baltic to the Black Sea was completed.
The British and French ruling circles, which went on abusing
the USSR and calling it an aggressor for creating an "Eastern"
front, evidently did not realize that the appearance of an "Eastern" front signified a radical tq.rn in the development of the war
-a turn against Hitlerite tyranny, a turn in favor of a victory
for democracy.
They did not realize that it was not a question of infringing
or not infringing upon the national rights of Finland, Lithuania,
Latvia, Estonia, Poland, but that the point was to organize victory over the Nazis in order to prevent the conversion of those
countries into disfranchised colonies of Hitler Germany.
They did not realize that the point was to build up a barrier
against the advance of the German troops wherever that was
possible, to organize a strong defense and then to launch a counteroffensive, smash the Hitlerite -troops and 'thereby create the
opportunity for the free development of those countries.
They did not realize that there existed no other way to defeat
Hitler's aggression.
Was the British Government right when it stationed its troops
in Egypt during the war in spite of the protests of the Egyptians
and even resistance on the part of certain elements in Egypt?
Unquestionably it was right. That was a highly important means
of barring the way to Hitler's aggression toward the Suez Canal,
of safeguarding Egypt against Hitler's attempts, of organizing
victory over Hitler, and thus averting the conversion of Egypt
into a colony of Hitler Germany, Only enemies of democracy
or people who have lost their senses can assert that the action of
the British Government in that case constituted aggression.
Was the United States Government right when it landed its
troops at Casablanca in spite of the .protests of the Moroccans and
of direct military counteraction on the part of the Petain Gov-
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ernment of France whose authority extended to Morocco? U nquestionably it was right. That was a highly important means of
creating a base to counteract German aggression in immediate
proximity to Western Europe, of organizing victory over Hitler's
troops and thus creating the opportunity for liberating France
from Hitler's colonial oppression. Only enemies of democracy or
people who have lost their senses could regard these actions of
American troops as aggression.
But then the same must be said about the actions of the Soviet
Government which by the summer of 1940 organized an "Eastern" front against Hitlerite aggression and stationed its troops
as far west as possible from Leningrad, Moscow, and Kiev. That
was the only means of barring the way of an unhindered advance
of the German troops eastward, of building up strong defenses
and then launching a counteroffensive in order. to smash, jointly
with the Allies, Hitler's Army and thus prevent the conversion
of peace-loving countries of Europe, among them Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland into .colonies of Hitler Germany. Only enemies of democracy or people who have lost their
senses could describe those actions of the Soviet Government as
aggresSIon.
But it follows . from this that Chamberlain, Daladier, and
their entourage, who described this policy of the Soviet Government as aggression , and organized the expulsion of the Soviet
Union from the League of Nations, acted as enemies of democracy or as people who had lost their senses.
From this it follows, further, that the present-day slanderers
and falsifiers of history who work in company with Messrs. Bevin
and Bidault and describe the creation of an "Eastern" front
against Hitler as aggression are also acting as enemies of democcracy or as people who have lost their senses.
What would have happened if, prior to Germany's attack, the
USSR had not created an "Eastern" front far to the west of the
old frontiers of the USSR, if that front had not been on the line
Vyborg-Kaunas-Byelostok-Brest-Lvov, but had followed the old
frontier-Leningrad- N arva-Minsk-Kiev?
That would have given Hitler's forces an opportunity to win
hundreds of kilometers, bringing the German front some two to

.
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three hundred kilometers nearer to Leningrad-Moscow-MinskKiev, greatly accelerating the Germans' advance into the interior of the USSR, hastening the fall of Kiev and the Ukraine,
leading to the capture of Moscow by the Germans and to the
capture of Leningrad by the combined German and Finnish forces,
and compelling the USSR to pass to the defensive for a long
time, which would have enabled the Germans to release some
fifty divisions in the east for a landing on the British Isles and
for reinforcing the Geqnan-Italian front in the area of Egypt.
Most likely the British Government would then have had to
evacuate to Canada, while Egypt and the Suez Canal would have
fallen under Hitler's sway.
But that is not all. The USSR would have been compelled to
transfer a large part of i.ts troops from the Manchurian border
to the "Eastern" front to strengthen its defenses, and that would
have enabled the Japanese to release some thirty divisions in Manchuria and to send them against China, against the Philippine's,
against southeastern Asia in general, and in the final analysis
against the American armed forces in the Far East.
As a result of all that, the war would have dragged on at least
for two more years. The Second World War would then have
ended, not in 1945, but in 1947 or somewhat later.
That was how matters stood with regard to the question of an
"Eastern" front.
Meanwhile, events in the West took their course. In April,
1940, the Germans occupied D.e nmark and Norway. In the middle of May, German troops invaded Holland, Belgium and Lux. embourg. On May 21, the Germans reached the Channel and
cut off the Allies in Flanders. Toward the . end of May, the
British troops evacuated Dunkirk, withdrawing from France to
England. In the middle of June, Paris fell. On June 22, France
surrendered to Germany.
Thus, Hitler trampled on all and sundry declarations of nonaggression issued jointly with France and Britain.
It meant the utter fiasco of the pol.icy of appeasement, of the
policy of renouncing collective security, of the policy of isolating
the USSR.
It became clear that, by isolating the USSR, France and .
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Britain had broken up the united front of the freedom-loving
countries, had weakened themselves, and had placed themselves
in isolation.
.
On March 1, 1941, the Germans occupied Bulgaria.
On April 5, the USSR signed a pact of non-aggression with
Yugoslavia.
On June 22 of that year Germany attacked the USSR.
Italy, Romania, Hungary, and Finland joined Germany in the
war against the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union joined the war of liberation against Hitler
Germany.
Different circles in Europe and America took different attitudes toward this event.
The nations enslaved by Hitler breathed a sigh of relief, as they
were certain that Hitler was bound to break his neck between
the two fronts, the Western and the "Eastern".
, The ruling circles o'f France were full of malicious glee as they
did not doubt that "Russia would be smashed" in practically no
time.
.
A prominent member of the Senate of the United States of
America who is now President of the United States, Mr. Truman, stated on the day after Germany's attack upon the USSR:
"If we see that Germany is winni~g the war we ought to
help Russia, and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany, and in that way let them kill as many as possible."36
A similar statement was made in 1941 in Great Britain by
the then Minister 'of Aircraft Production, Moore-Brabazon" who
said that so far as Britain was concerned, the best outcome of the
struggle on the Eastern front would be the mutual exhaustion of
Germany and the USSR, as a result of which Britain would be
enabled to attain a position of dominance.
These statements undoubtedly expressed the position of reactionary circles in the United States and Great Britain.
However, the overwhelming majority of the British and American people favored the USSR, . demanding unity with .the Soviet
Union for a successful struggle against Hitler Germany.
S6

New York Times, June 24, 1941.
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It is to be believed that the Prime Minister of Great Britain,
Mr. Churchill, reflected these sentiments when he said on June
22, 1941 that:
"The Russian danger is therefore our danger and the danger
of the United States, just as the cause of any Russian fighting
for his hearth and home is the cause of free men and free peoples
in every quarter of the globe."
A similar position with regard to the USSR was taken by the
Roosevelt Administration in the United States of America.
A beginning was thus laid for an Anglo-Soviet-American
coalition against Hitler Germany.
The anti-Hitler coalition set itself the aim of smashing the
Hitler regime and liberating the. nations enslaved by Hitler Germany. Despite differences in the ideologies and economic systems
of the Allied states, the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition became
a mighty alliance of nations which merged their efforts in the
liberation struggle against Hitlerism.
Of course, there were differences among the Allies on certain
questions during the war too. It is well known, for example, how
significant were the differences on such maj o.r questions as the
opening of a second ' front, the obligations of the Allies, their
moral duty toward each other.
Seizing upon these differences, the falsifiers of history and all
sorts of calumniators are endeavoring to "prove", contrary to
obvious facts, that the USSR was not, and could not be, a loyal
and sincere ally in the struggle against Hitlerite aggression. But
since the joint struggle against Hitler Germany and the -behavior
of the USSR in that struggle provide no material for such an
accusation, they turn to the past, to the prewar period, asserting
that during the "negotiations" with Hitler in Berlin in 1940, the
representatives of the Soviet Union behaved in a perfidious manner, not as allies should behave.
They assert that during the Berlin "negotiations" perfidious
"plans for the partitioning of Europe", territorial claims of the
Soviet Union "southward from the Soviet Union toward the Indian Ocean", "plans" concerning Turkey, Iran, Bulgaria and
other "problems" were discussed and agreed upon. For this purpose the slanderers make use of reports of German ambassadors

53

and other Hitlerite officials, all sorts of memoranda and German
drafts of sQme sort of "protocols" and other similar "documents".
What actually happened in Berlin? It must be $aid that the
so-called "Berlin negotiations" in 1940 actually amounted to
nothing more than V. M. Molotov's return visit to two visits
paid by Ribbentrop to Moscow. The talks which took place concerned, mainly, Soviet-German relations. Hitler tried to turn
them into the basis for a broad agreement between the· German
and Soviet parties. The Soviet side, on the contrary, used them
to sound out, to probe the position of the German side without
having any intention of concluding any agreement with the Germans. In the course of these talks, Hitler maintained that the
Soviet Union ought to acquire an outlet to the Persian Gulf by
occupying western Iran and the Eritish oil fields in Iran. He said,
further, that Germany could help the Soviet Union to settle the
matter in regard to its claims on Turkey, including the amendment of the Montreux Treaty on the Straits; and while completely ignoring the interests of Iran, he carefully protected the
interests of Turkey, obviously regarding the latter country as· his
present, or at any rate, his future ally. As far as the Balkan
countries and Turkey were concerned, Hitler rega~ded them as
a sphere of influence of Germany and Italy.
The Soviet Government drew the following conclusions from
these talks: Germany did not value her connections with Iran;
Germany was not connected and did not intend to establish connections with Britain, which meant that the Soviet Union might
find a reliable ally in Britain against Hitler Germany; the Balkan States had either been already bought over and converted
into Germany's satellites [Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary], had
been enslaved like Czechoslovakia, or were on the way to being
enslaved like Greece; Yugoslavia was the only Balkan country
that could be relied upon as a future ally of the anti-Hitler
camp; Turkey was already either bound by close ties to Hitler
Germany or intended to form such ties.
Having drawn these u~eful conclusions, the Soviet Government never again resumed any talks on these questions despite
Ribbentrop's repeated reminders.
As can be seen, this was a case of sounding out, of probing the
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posItIon of the Hitler Government by the Soviet Government,
which did not arid could not end in any sort of agreement.
Is it permissible for peace-loving states to practice such a sounding out of an enemy's position? Unquestionably it is. It is not
only permissible, but at times it is a direct political necessity. It is
only necessary that such a sounding should take place with the
knowledge and consent of allies, and that its results should be
communicated to allies. At that time, however, the Soviet Union
had no allies; it was isolated and unfortunately had nobody with
whom to share the results of its sounding.
It should be said that a similar-although ill-smelling-sounding of the position of Hitler Germany was effected by representatives of Britain and the United States of America during the
war, after the organization of the anti-Hitler coalition of Britain,
the .United States c:tf America and the USSR. This is evident
from documents captured by Soviet troops in Germany.
From these documents it can be seen that in the autumn of
1941 and also in 1942 and 1943, in Lisbon and in Switzerland,
negotiations were carried on, behind the back of the USSR, between representatives of Britain and Germany, and later between
representatives of the United States of America and Germany,
on the subject of peace with Germany.
One of the documents-a supplement to a report by Weizsaecker, the German Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs-reviews the course of these negotiations in Lisbon in September
1941. This document shows that on September 13, there was a
meeting between Aitken; the son of Lord Beaverbrook, an officer
of the British Army and later a Member of Parliament, representing Britain, and Gustav von Koever, a Hungarian, who acted
with the authority of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
this can be seen from a letter addressed by Krauel, the German
Consul General in Geneva, to W eizsaecker, the German Deputy
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
During the course of these negotiations Aitken posed the question directly: "Could not the coming winter and spring be used
to discuss, behind the scenes, the possibilities of peace?"
Other documents tell of the negotiations which took place between representatives of the Governments of the United States
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of America and Germany in Switzerland in February, 1943. In
these negotiations, the United States of America was represented
by a special delegate of the United States Government, Allen
Dulles (the b~other of John Foster Dulles) who figured under
the pseudonym of "Bull" and had "direct instructions and authority from the White House". His German opposite number
was Prince M. Hohenloe, a man closely connected with the ruling
circles of Hitler Germany, who acted as Hitler's representative
under the assumed name of Pauls. The document containing a
summary of these negotiations belonged to the German Security
Service (SD).
As evident from this document, the conversation touched on
important questions concerning Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland,
Romania, Hungary and-this is particularly important-the
question of the conclusion of peace with GerJ11any.
During the conversation, Dulles (Bull), stated that:
"In future, a situation will never again be permitted to arise
where nations like Germany would be compelled to resort to
desperate experiments and heroism as a result of injustice and
want. The German State must continue to exist as a factor of
order and rehabilitation. The partition of Germany or the
separation of Austria is out of the question."
Concerning Poland, Dulles (Bull) stated:
". . . by extending Poland to the East and preserving Romania and a strong Hungary, the establishment of a cordon
sanitaire -against Bolshevism and Pan-Slavism must be supported." 37
The record of the conversation further says that:
"Mr. Bull more or less agrees to the political and industrial
organization of Europe on the basis of large territories, on the
assumption that a federated Greater Germany (similar to the
United States of America) with the adjoining Danubian Confederation will constitute the best guarantee of order and rehabilitation in Central and Eastern Europe."38
37 The
conversation Pauls-Mr. Bull, - from the documents of German
Archives.
38 Ibid.
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Dulles (Bull) also stated that he fully recognized the claim
of German industry to the leading role in Europe.
It must be noted that this sounding was effected by the British
and Americans "without the knowledge or consent of their ally,
the Soviet Union, .and that nothing was communicated to the
Soviet Government concerning the results of it, even by way of
subsequent information.
This could mean that the Governments of the United States
of America and Great Britain had in this instance made an attempt to inaugurate negotiations with Hitler for a separate peace.
Clearly, such behavior on the part of the Governments of
Britain and the United States of America can only be regarded
as an infringement of the "most elementary requirements in respect of their allied duty and allied obligations.
It therefore follows that the falsifiers of history, in accusing
the USSR of "insincerity" are trying to shift the blame where it
does not belong.
Beyond any doubt, the falsifiers of history and other slanderers
know of these documents. If they conceal them from the public,
if they keep silent concerning them in their campaign of slander
against the USSR, it is because they fear historical truth like the
plague.
As regards the differences of opinion concerning the opening
of the Second Front, they reflected the different conceptions of the
obligations of allies in respect to each other. Soviet people believe that if an ally is in trouble one should help him by all available means; that one should not treat an ally as a temporary fellow traveler, but as a friend; one should rejoice in his successes
and in his growing strength. British and American representatives do not agree with this and consider such morality naive.
They are guided by the notion that a strong ally is dangerous;
that the strengthening of an ally is not in their interests; that it
is better to have a weak ally than a strong one; and that if an
ally nevertheless grows stronger, then measures should be adopted
to weaken him.
Everybody knows that in the . Anglo-Sovie and the SovietAmerican communiques of June, 1942, the British and Americans assumed the obligation of opening the Second Front in
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Europe as early as 1942. This was a solemn promise, a vow, if
you will, which should have been fulfilled on time in order to
make things easier for the Soviet forces, who, during the ,first
period of the war, had borne the full brunt of resistance to German fascism. It is also well known, howe~er, that this promise
was not fulfilled either in 1942 or in 1943, despite the fact that
the Soviet Government declared on several occasions that the
Soviet Union could not reconcile itself to the postponement of
the Second Front.
There was nothing fortuitous about the policy of postponing
the opening of 'the Second Front. It" was fostered by the aspirations of those reactionary circles in Britain and the United States
of America who pursued their own aims in the war against Germany, aims that had nothing in common with the aims of a war
of liberation against German fascism. Their plans did not call
for the utter defeat of German fascism. They were interested in
undermining Germany's power and, mainly, in eliminating Germany as a dangerous competitor on the world market, in conformity with their narrow, selfish aims. They did not, however,
at all intend to liberate Germany and other countries from the
rule of reactionary forces which are the constant source of imperialist aggression and of fascism, or to carry out fundamental
democratic reforms.
At the same time they calculated that the USSR would be
weakened, bled white, that as a result of the exhausting war it
would for a long period of time lose its importance as a great
and mighty power and would, after the war, become dependent
upon the United States of America and Great Britain.
The Soviet . Union, naturally, cannot consider such an attitude
toward an ally as normal.
Diametrically opposed to this policy is the policy pursued by
the USSR in relations among the Allies. This policy is characterized by invariably unselfish, consistent and honest observance
of its undertakings and by readiness to render, at any time, comradely assistance to its ally. During the past war, the Soviet
Union set exan1ples of such a truly allied attitude toward other
countries, its comrades-in-arms in the struggle against the common
enemy.
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Here is one such fact.
It will be remembered that at the end of December, 1944, the
Hitler troops launched an offensive in the Ardennes area on the
Western front, broke through the front and placed the AngloAmerican troops in a difficult position. According to the Allies,
the Germans hoped, ' by attacking in the direction of Liege, to
crush the First American Army, reach Antwerp, cut off the Ninth
American, Second British, and First Canadian Armies, and arrange a second Dunkirk for the Allies in order to put Britain
out of the war.
In connection with this, on January 6, 1945, Winston Ch\lrchill
addressed to J. V. Stalin the following message:
"The fighting in the West is very heavy and at any time
great decisions may be called for from the Supreme Command.
You know yourself from your own experience how very anxious
the position is when a very broad front has to be defended after
temporary loss of the initiative. It is General Eisenhower's
great desire and need to know in outline what you plan to do,
as this obviously affects all his and our major decisions. Our
envoy, Air Chief Marshal Tedder, was last night reported
weatherbound in Cairo. His journey has been much delayed
through no fault of yours. In case he has not reached you yet,
I shall be grateful if you can tell me whether we can count on
a major Russian offensive on the Vistula front, or elsewhere,
during January, with any other points you may care to mention. I shall not pass this most secret information to anyone
except Field Marshal Brooke and General Eisenhower, and
only under conditions of the utmost secrecy. I regard the matter as urgent." .
On January 7, 1945, J. V. Stalin sent W. Churchill the following answer:
"I received your message of January 6, 1945, on the evening
of January 7.
"U nfortunately, Air Chief Marshal Tedder has not yet
reached Moscow.
"It is:very important to make use of our superiority over the
Germans in artillery and air force. For this we need- clear
weather for the air force and an absence of low mists, which
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prevent the artillery from conducting aimed fire. We are preparing an offensive, but at present the weather does not favor
our offensive. However, in view of the position of our Allies
on the Western front, Headquarters of the Supreme Command has decided to complete the preparations at a forced pace,
and, disregarding the weather, to launch wide-scale offensive
operations against . the Gennans all along the Central front
not later than the second half of January. You need not doubt
that we shall do everything that can possibly be done to render
help to the glorious troops of our Allies."
In his reply to this message, W. Churchill wrote to J. V.
Stalin on January 9:
"I am most grateful to you for your thrilling message. I
have sent it to General Eisenhower for his eye only. Mayall
good fortune rest upon your noble venture."
In their desire to expedite aid to the Allied forces in the West,
the Supreme High Command of the Soviet forces decided to move
the date of the offensive against the Germans on the Soviet-German front from January 20 to January 12. On January 12 a
great offensive was launched by the Soviet forces on a wide front
from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians. One hundred and fifty
Soviet divisions were set in motion, supported by a large quantity
of artillery and aircraft; they broke through the German front
and threw the German troops back for hundreds of kilometers.
On January 12, German troops on the Western front, among
them the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies, which had been placed
in position for another drive, ceased their offensive and during
the course of five or six days w~re withdrawn .from the front and
transferred to the East against the attacking Soviet troops. The
German offensive in· the West was frustrated.
On January 17, W. Churchill wrote to J. V. Stalin:
"I am most grateful to you for your message and am extremely glad that Air Marshal Tedder made so favorable an
impression upon you. On behalf of His Majesty's Government
and from the bottom of my heart, I offer you our thanks and
congratulations on the immense assault you have launched upon
the Eastern front.
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"You will now, no doubt, know the plans of General
hower and to what extent they have been delayed by
stedt's spoiling attack. I am sure that fighting along our
front will be continuous. The British Twenty-first
Group, under Field Marshal Montgomery, has today
an attack in the area south of Roermond."

EisenRundwhole
Army
begun

An Order of the Day issued by J. V. Stalin to Soviet troops
in February 1945, said, concerning this offensive of Soviet troops:
"In January of this year, the Red Army brought down upon
. the enemy a blow of unparalleled force along the entire front
from the Baltic to the Carpathians. On a stretch of 1,200
kilometers it broke up the powerful defenses of the Germans,
which they had been building for a number of years. In the
course of the offensive, the Red Army, by its swift and skillful
actions, has hurled the enemy far back to the West. The first
consequence of the successes of our winter offensive was that
they thwarted the Germans' winter offensive in the West,
which aimed at the seizure of Belgium and Alsace, and they
enabled the Armies of our Allies in their turn to launch an
offensive against the Germans and thus to link up their offensive operations in the West with the offensive operations of
the Red Army in the East."
That is how J. V. Stalin acted.
That is how true allies act in a common struggle.
These are the facts.
Naturally, the falsifiers of history and the slanderers are called
falsifiers and slanderers because · they do not entertain any respect
for facts. They prefer to gossip and slander. There is, however,
no reason to doubt that these gentlemen will, in the end, have to
acknowledge the universally known truth, which is, that gossip
and slander perish but the facts remain.
.
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